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Abbreviations 
Acronym Description 
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability 
CSTP Conditional Source Term category Probability 
CCF Common Cause Failure 
MCS Minimal Cut Set 
MUCDF Multi-Unit Core Damage Frequency 
MUIE Multi-Unit Initiating Event 
MUSTF Multi-unit Source Term category combination Frequency 
POS Plant Operating State 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
SCDF Site Core Damage Frequency 
SSC Systems, Structures and Components 
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1. Introduction 
In site probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), a nuclear power plant site is analysed as a whole 
considering all reactor units and other facilities with radioactive sources. Site PSA especially 
focuses on dependencies between different units and locations of the radioactive sources. For 
example, an external hazard can affect multiple reactor units or facilities at the same time, and 
then resources shared between the units might not be available for all units to manage the 
accident. Most PSAs are unit specific, and there are no well-established methods for site PSA. 
Site PSA methods have been studied in separate research reports [1-2]. In addition to 
methods, procedures are needed for documenting the analysis, managing possible 
modifications made to the PSA models, and managing the data and computation. This report 
provides guidance for site PSA model management and discusses the needs for site PSA 
database. The work is partly based on the requirements presented in [3]. The report is closely 
connected to the method report [1] and it considers the same analysis phases. 
The selection of the risk metrics to be calculated is the starting point for the site PSA. Risk 
metrics for site PSA have been outlined in [4]. The main site risk metrics for level 1 PSA are 
the site core damage frequency (SCDF) and the multi-unit core damage frequency (MUCDF). 
The SCDF is the frequency for any core damage to occur at the site per site-year. The MUCDF 
is the frequency of core damage occurring in multiple units nearly simultaneously. The MUCDF 
can be calculated for a specific combination of units, and also the total MUCDF can be 
calculated as the frequency of core damage occurring in at least two units taking into account 
all the units at the site. Computation of risk importance measures with regard to different risk 
metrics is also an important part of site PSA. MUCDF and SCDF can be generalised to concern 
fuel damage instead of core damage when radioactive sources other than reactor cores are 
included in the analysis. The main risk metrics for level 2 PSA are the frequencies of site 
release categories. 
Section 2 summarises the method developed in [1] and introduces some basic concepts. 
Section 3 discusses the challenges related to site PSA analysis and model management. 
Single-unit models are discussed in Section 4, site PSA document is outlined in Section 5, and 
database for site PSA is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 goes through the whole site PSA 
analysis process from the model management point of view. Maintenance of site PSA is briefly 
discussed in Section 8. The conclusions of the report are presented in Section 9. 
2. Method description  
Method for evaluating the site risk for nuclear installations using already existing single-unit 
PSA models is presented in [1]. This section summarizes the method in order to provide basic 
information as a link to the site PSA model management. 
Site PSA mainly concerns three types of analysis elements: 
- plant operating states 
- multi-unit initiators 
- multi-unit dependencies. 
A multi-unit initiator is an event that can initiate an accident in multiple units. A multi-unit 
dependency is a dependency that can cause an event to affect multiple units or dependent 
events in multiple units. Dependencies related to multi-unit initiators are not included in the 
category “multi-unit dependencies” here, because they are considered separately. 
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Based on [1], the following analysis steps can be identified: 
1. Selection of analysis scope and risk metrics: In this step, the scope of the site PSA 
is selected. The following issues should be considered in the selection: different 
radioactive sources, possible operating states, initiators, and PSA end states. The 
scope of the site PSA needs to be consistent with the scope of the single-unit PSA. 
2. Analysis of POS impact: Site PSA needs to account for the units’ various 
combinations of possible plant operating states (POSs). The POSs come directly from 
single-unit PSAs and they concern only one unit. POS groups are created based on 
individual POSs that are sufficiently similar. POS groups also concern only one unit. 
Then, POS groups of different units are combined to create POS group combinations 
that include one POS group from each unit included in the analysis. POS groups and 
POS group combinations are screened so that only the most relevant POS group 
combinations are included in the quantification. 
Figure 1 illustrates the creation of POS group combination with four POSs and two 
units. The POS groups with POS D are screened out, as well as the POS group 
combination with POSs B and C coming from both of the units. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the creation of POS group combinations. 
3. Identification of multi-unit initiators: There are three types of multi-unit initiators: 
- Multi-unit initiating events (MUIEs, that affect always multiple units) 
- Partial multi-unit initiating events (that may affect one or multiple units) 
- Propagating events: Accident starts in one unit and propagates later to another 
unit. 
Partial multi-unit initiating events are divided into multi-unit initiating events and single-
unit initiating events, and the multi-unit initiating events are included in the further 
analysis. 
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The multi-unit initiators are screened, and the most relevant ones are selected for 
quantification. Relevant combinations of multi-unit initiators and POS group 
combinations are identified for the analysis. Let a pair of a multi-unit initiator and POS 
group combination be called a multi-unit analysis case. 
Figure 2 illustrates how multi-unit analysis cases are constructed based on multi-unit 
initiators and the POS group combinations which were screened in previously. 
Propagating event PE (the orange block) is screened out. Based on partial multi-unit 
initiating event, new multi-unit initiating event MUIE3 is created. Multi-unit initiating 
event MUIE2 is not relevant for POSs B and C, and the corresponding analysis cases 
are thus not created. Analysis cases with MUIE1 and POS group combinations A-BC 
and BC-A are also screened out. Five multi-unit analysis cases are left for further 
analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the creation of multi-unit analysis cases. 
4. Identification and selection of dependencies: Different types of multi-unit 
dependencies include 
- shared systems, structures, and components (SSC) 
- identical components 
- spatial dependencies 
- human and organizational dependencies 
- containment and vessel design 
- simultaneous maintenance 
- phenomenological uncertainty (e.g. epistemic uncertainty related to severe 
accident phenomena can be common for two units). 
Identified multi-unit dependencies are screened qualitatively. Single-unit basic events 
associated with the screened in multi-unit dependencies are identified. Multi-unit 
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dependencies are screened quantitatively based on the single-unit basic events. For 
each multi-unit analysis case, the relevant multi-unit dependencies are identified. 
Figure 3 illustrates the screening process of multi-unit dependencies. One dependency 
is screened out qualitatively, and one dependency is screened out quantitatively. Then, 
relevant multi-unit dependencies are identified for each multi-unit analysis case. 
 
Figure 3: Screening of multi-unit dependencies. 
From the screened in multi-unit dependencies, multi-unit basic events are selected. A 
multi-unit basic event is a set of dependent events in multiple units or an event affecting 
multiple units. One or multiple multi-unit basic events can be selected based on a multi-
unit dependency. For each multi-unit analysis case, the relevant multi-unit basic events 
are identified. 
5. Analysis of source terms: This step is relevant only when level 2 analysis is 
considered. Source term categories are analyzed to determine which of them are 
relevant for the screened in MUIEs. Screening of source terms can be performed based 
on single-unit PSA results. Then combined source terms are studied to examine how 
the source term combinations are mapped into site release categories. Finally, the 
relevance of source term combinations for multi-unit analysis is assessed. Relevance 
of a source term combination is dependent on the applied risk metrics. Final selection 
of release categories to be analyzed can also be made at this point. 
6. Data analysis: The frequencies of multi-unit initiators and the probabilities of multi-unit 
basic events are estimated in each multi-unit analysis case. 
7. Quantification of multi-unit risks: The analyst can select one of the two following 
approaches: 
a. Multi-unit event combinations approach: 
A multi-unit scenario is defined as a combination including 
- a POS group combination 
- a multi-unit initiator 
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- zero, one or multiple multi-unit basic events. 
Multi-unit scenarios are created for the quantification based on the multi-unit 
analysis cases and multi-unit basic events relevant for each analysis case. In 
an analysis case, all possible combinations of relevant multi-unit basic events, 
i.e. all possible multi-unit scenarios, are considered. 
The frequency of each multi-unit scenario is calculated as the frequency of the 
initiator multiplied by the probabilities of multi-unit basic events. The conditional 
core damage probability (CCDP) or conditional source term category 
probabilities (CSTPs) of each multi-unit scenario are also calculated. The 
MUCDF of a multi-unit scenario is then the frequency of the multi-unit scenario 
multiplied by the CCDP values. Similarly, the multi-unit source term category 
combination frequency (MUSTF) is the frequency of the multi-unit scenario 
multiplied by the CSTP values corresponding to source term category 
combination. The risk metrics and risk importance values are calculated based 
on the MUCDF or MUSTF values of the multi-unit scenarios. 
b. Minimal cut set list approach: 
The minimal cut set (MCS) lists of different units are combined, and the risk 
metrics and risk importance values are calculated based on the combined MCS 
list(s). The quantification is in principle similar to single-unit PSA quantification. 
3. Challenges  
Site PSA introduces new challenges for documentation, PSA model management and 
computation tools. Site PSA involves information and data from many different sources, use 
of multiple PSA models, and several analysis steps, which are potentially applied to a large 
set of dependencies between units. Systematic data management and documentation 
procedures are therefore needed to manage the site level analysis process as a whole. 
Single-unit PSA models need to be extended to include significant multi-unit dependencies if 
they have not been modelled before. In addition to documentation, this can be a challenge for 
PSA model configuration management and change tracking point of view. In addition, some 
specific scenarios may require special calculations with a single-unit PSA model, e.g. to 
determine the probability that a shared system is used. This may require creation of new 
special versions of single-unit PSA models. 
Multi-unit risk is estimated based on the information from the different units, which means that 
risk metrics and risk importance measures are not obtained directly from a single PSA model 
like in single-unit analyses. Total site calculations need to combine somehow the results from 
different PSA models. 
The maintenance of a site PSA is also more challenging than the maintenance of a single-unit 
PSA. When a modification is made to one unit, site results need to also be updated. PSAs 
should also be updated in parallel for site PSA, not one by one. Site PSA could even be 
maintained as living PSA. 
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4. Single-unit PSA models 
4.1 Requirements for single-unit PSA models 
In the site PSA method [1], it is assumed that single-unit PSA covers all scenarios and events 
that can significantly affect single-unit risk, including multi-unit accident scenarios. It has to be 
possible to calculate the conditional core damage probability of a multi-unit scenario (defined 
in Section 2) correctly using a single-unit model. In other words, the consequences of multi-
unit events have to be modelled correctly in single-unit PSAs. 
Risk-significant shared systems need to be taken correctly into account in the site level 
quantification. The unavailability of a shared system due to its use in another unit has to be 
included in the single-unit models as discussed in Section 4.2. 
When the analysis includes level 2, it needs to be possible to calculate the conditional source 
term category probabilities of multi-unit accident scenarios. If release categorisation is 
changed/simplified compared to the single-unit PSA (e.g. one release category for 
unacceptable release is used instead of splitting it into multiple release categories), there might 
be a need to change the release categorisation in the versions of the single-unit models used 
in site PSA. 
If spent fuel pool belonging to a reactor unit is included in the scope of the analysis, the single-
unit PSA should cover both the reactor risks and the spent fuel pool risks. It is not necessary 
to include them in the same PSA model as long as conditional fuel damage probabilities and 
conditional source term category probabilities of multi-unit scenarios can be calculated. 
4.2 Modelling multi-unit aspects in single-unit models 
Some multi-unit scenarios may need to be modelled in single-unit models, particularly 
scenarios involving a shared system or human actions. Separating multi-unit events, 
particularly multi-unit initiating events, from single-unit events in single-unit models can make 
modelling of site dependencies easier, since human error probabilities or unavailabilities of 
shared systems can be different in different scenarios. Easy identification of multi-unit events 
would also be useful. An identifier could e.g. appear in the name or comment of a multi-unit 
event. 
The probability that a shared system is needed in another unit needs to be considered in single-
unit PSA. The probability may need to be calculated using the PSA model of the other unit. 
The probability can be assumed to be multi-unit initiator specific. A special version of the 
corresponding event tree can be created so that the end points of the event tree represent 
conditions where the shared system is needed. The initiating event frequency can be set to 1, 
and then the probability that the shared system is used can be calculated directly from the 
event tree. Some probabilities related to multi-unit dependencies, such as identical 
components, may also need to be adjusted. The event tree does not need to be used, if the 
unavailability of the shared system can be determined without it, e.g. if the case is very simple. 
The basic event can then be added to the other single-unit model. There can be basic events 
representing the same shared system with different probabilities for different multi-unit 
initiators. A house event or an attribute can be used to select the correct basic event for each 
multi-unit initiator. 
If there is no priority logic for the use of a system shared between two units, it could be 
reasonable to divide the calculated probabilities by 2, because the system could be used in 
either of the units. For example, if probability 𝑝1 is calculated for the scenario that the shared 
system is also needed in the other unit, probability 𝑝1/2 can be used in the PSA model. In 
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addition, the system has a failure probability 𝑝2. It needs to also be scaled by 1 − 𝑝1/2. The 
failure can be modelled as a separate basic event. 
It can be stated with some justification that human error probabilities are higher in some multi-
unit scenarios. Detailed considerations of human error probabilities in multi-unit scenarios can 
be found in [1]. The modelling is straightforward, if multi-unit scenarios can be separated from 
single-unit scenarios in the model, e.g. as separate accident sequences or in the post-
processing of minimal cut sets. 
Initiating events induced by an accident in another unit need to be taken into account. If such 
event is found significant, it can be modelled as a separate initiating event or included in the 
frequency of the corresponding single-unit initiating event. The model of the originating unit 
may need to be used in the computation of frequency. In addition, the probability of the 
propagation between units needs to be estimated. 
4.3 Updating single-unit models based on multi-unit analysis 
It is possible that a need to update single-unit models is noticed when performing multi-unit 
analysis. It is important to keep the single-unit models up-to-date both from the single-unit and 
multi-unit analysis point of view. The best option is to perform the correction right away when 
a need to update (e.g. due to a defect or improvement with regard to increase in realism) is 
noticed. It also needs to be judged if the analyses performed before the observation need to 
be revised, e.g. quantitative screening. 
It is very case specific what may need to be updated. The update can e.g. be the addition of a 
new basic event, or the change of a probability or frequency. Modelling of shared systems and 
human error events are the areas that could most likely require updates from the multi-unit 
perspective. 
5. Site PSA documentation 
Site PSA needs to be documented comprehensively. The following chapter titles are 
recommended to be used in the document: 
o Selection of analysis scope and risk metrics 
o Data sources and models 
o Analysis of POS impact 
o Identification of multi-unit initiators 
o Identification and selection of dependencies 
o Analysis of source terms (level 2 only) 
o Data analysis 
o Quantification of multi-unit risks 
o Documents and files used in the analysis 
Section 7 of this document specifies what information should be documented under these 
chapters. 
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6. Database for site PSA 
A database system is needed to manage the analysis process. It can be just a set of Excel 
sheets, but since many of the analysis elements are interrelated, a more advanced database 
system could be considered, e.g. Microsoft Access. 
Analysis elements that could be included in the database are presented in Table 1, along with 
possible data fields. Section 2 contains information on how different analysis elements are 
linked to the analysis phases. For some data fields, Section 7 provides some further 
explanation. 
Table 1: Site PSA elements. 
Element Description Possible data fields 
Plant operating state Plant operating state 
as defined in single-
unit PSA 
Identifier, description, time share, status of 
primary circuit, status of the core cooling 
system, status of the residual heat removal 
system, status of spent fuel pool, multi-unit 
initiators 
POS group Group of sufficiently 
similar POSs for site 
PSA purposes 
concerning a single 
unit 
Identifier, POSs belonging to the group, 
justification for the grouping, time share, time 
window for core/fuel damage in case of loss of 
residual heat removal, screening decision, 
justification for the screening decision, multi-
unit initiators 
POS group combination Combination of POS 
groups (including one 
group from each 
unit) 
Identifier, the POS groups included in the 
combination (with correspondence to units), 
time share, screening decision, justification for 
the screening decision, multi-unit initiators 
Multi-unit initiator Initiating event that 
can potentially cause 
accident in multiple 
units (including 
accident propagation 
to another unit) 
Identifier, category, description, frequency, 
screening decision, justification for the 
screening decision, source documents, the 
corresponding initiating events in the single-
unit models, relevant POSs, POS dependency, 
season dependency, POS group combinations 
to be included in the analysis, justification for 
the selection of POS group combinations, 
affected unit combination, data sources, 
frequency estimation method, frequencies in 
different POS group combinations 
Partial multi-unit 
initiating event 
Initiating event that 
may affect one or 
multiple units 
Multi-unit initiating events created based on 
this partial multi-unit initiating event, data 
sources, frequency estimation method used in 
single-unit PSA, frequencies in single-unit 
models, summary of operating data, qualitative 
analysis, frequency estimation methods for site 
PSA, new frequencies 
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Element Description Possible data fields 
Multi-unit analysis case A pair of a multi-unit 
initiator and POS 
group combination 
Identifier, multi-unit initiator, POS group 
combination, relevant multi-unit dependencies, 
relevant multi-unit basic events, frequency of 
the multi-unit initiator in the POS group 
combination 
Multi-unit dependency A dependency that 
can cause an event to 
affect multiple units 
or dependent events 
in multiple units 
(initiating event 
dependencies 
excluded) 
Identifier, category, description, qualitative 
ranking, justification for the qualitative ranking, 
source documents, related units, related basic 
events in the single-unit models, Fussell-Vesely 
in each multi-unit initiating event in each unit, 
maximum contribution from potential multi-
unit sequences in each unit, screening decision 
Multi-unit basic event A set of dependent 
events in multiple 
units or an event 
affecting multiple 
units 
Identifier, description, related multi-unit 
dependency, source documents, related units, 
related basic events in the single-unit models, 
relevant multi-unit analysis cases, probability in 
each relevant multi-unit analysis case 
Inter-unit CCF A CCF where 
components fail in 
multiple units 
(subcategory of 
multi-unit basic 
event) 
Identifier, component type, failure mode, units, 
group size, CCF combination, data sources, 
probability of the corresponding single-unit CCF 
in each unit, summary of operating data, model 
used in estimation, parameters used in 
estimation, probability of the inter-unit CCF 
Multi-unit human error 
event 
A human error event 
affecting multiple 
units or dependent 
human error events 
in multiple units 
(subcategory of 
multi-unit basic 
event) 
Identifier, description, related basic events in 
the single-unit models, probabilities of the 
basic events in single-unit models, qualitative 
assessment from multi-unit point of view, 
probability estimation procedure, penalty 
factor/dependency category in each relevant 
multi-unit analysis case, probability in each 
relevant multi-unit analysis case 
Source term Source term as 
defined in single-unit 
PSA 
Identifier, description, release size, release 
timing, other release characteristics, screening 
decision and justification 
Source term 
combination 
Combination of 
single-unit source 
terms (including one 
source term from 
each considered unit) 
Identifier, the source terms included in the 
combination, associated release category, 
screening decision, justification for screening 
and how the combined source terms are 
associated in the release category 
Release category Group of accident 
sequences with a 
similar source term 
at the site level 
Identifier, description, source term 
combinations 
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Several analysis elements are connected. A POS group combination consists of POS groups, 
and a POS group consists of POSs. Inter-unit CCFs and multi-unit human error events are 
multi-unit basic events with specific properties. Multi-unit basic events originate from multi-unit 
dependencies. A partial multi-unit initiating event is a multi-unit initiator with special properties. 
Some new multi-unit initiators are also created based on a partial multi-unit initiating event. 
Multi-unit initiators are also associated with specific POSs, POS groups and POS group 
combinations. Practically, POS groups and POS group combinations inherit the relevant multi-
unit initiators from individual POSs. A multi-unit analysis case consists of a multi-unit initiator 
and a POS group combination. 
In a database these connections can be presented as relationships (i.e. one table has a foreign 
key that references the primary key of another table).  For example, the POS data field (foreign 
key) of a POS group is linked to the respective POS table based on the POS element identifier 
(primary key). 
The database should include one or more tables for each analysis element type. Some 
functionality that could be useful includes: 
- Data could be inherited from an analysis element to another one. E.g. a POS group 
combination could automatically inherit multi-unit initiators from the POS groups 
participating in the combination. 
- It would be useful to sort tables according to different attributes. 
- It could be useful to customize tables, because some of analysis elements include 
many data fields and the user may be interested only on specific fields at a time. In 
addition, some analysis elements, like multi-unit dependencies and multi-unit initiators, 
go through multiple analysis phases and only some of the data fields are relevant for a 
single analysis phase. It could be useful to have different header sets or tables for 
different analysis phases. 
- Filtering of data could be useful. For example, the user could want to view only those 
multi-unit dependencies that are screened in for further analysis. 
- Since several analysis elements are connected, data links could be used so that it 
would be possible to e.g. jump from the data of multi-unit initiator to the data of an 
associated POS group combination. 
- Convenient ways for viewing data need to be considered. For example, it might be 
useful to view data only related to a single multi-unit analysis case because there are 
a lot of data connected to an analysis case (considering also the data of the multi-unit 
initiator and POS group combination of the analysis case). 
- Search functions would be useful (available in normal Excel application). 
- It should be possible to export selected tables to the site PSA document. 
- Since some computations need to be performed with the data, the computation 
formulas could be built in into the database system. For example, some inter-unit CCF 
probability estimation formulas could be useful. 
- Some data, like some initiating event frequencies and single-unit CCF probabilities, 
come from the databases of single-unit PSAs. Functionality to facilitate such data 
imports can be considered. 
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It can be useful to extend the database with a new analysis element: multi-unit scenario, which 
has been defined in Section 2. It is needed if the multi-unit event combinations approach (see 
Section 2) is used in quantification, and could be of interest also otherwise. A multi-unit 
scenario could have the following data fields: 
- Identifier 
- POS group combination 
- Multi-unit initiator 
- Multi-unit basic events 
- Frequency 
- The related initiating/basic events in the single-unit PSA models 
- The CCDP in each unit (given the multi-unit initiator, POS group combination and multi-
unit basic events) 
- The MUCDF of the scenario (for each combination of units if there are more than two 
units) 
The multi-unit scenarios could be created automatically based on the multi-unit analysis cases. 
An event tree presentation of a multi-unit analysis case could also be created. The multi-unit 
basic events would be the nodal questions in such event tree, and each sequence would 
represent a multi-unit scenario. 
If the minimal cut set list approach (see Section 2) is used in the computation, the combined 
minimal cut set list needs to be treated with a set of rules to ensure correct quantification. The 
database could support the practical implementation of such rules. For example, rules could 
be created automatically based on the multi-unit initiators and multi-unit basic events in the 
database or the database could directly serve as a set of rules if it was integrated with the 
computation tool. A typical example of a rule would be that two single-unit basic events related 
to the same multi-unit basic event are identified in the same minimal cut set, and the frequency 
of the minimal cut set is increased according to the probability of the multi-unit basic event. 
If minimal cut set lists are combined in the site PSA, different units cannot contain single-unit 
events with the same names. If there are same names, the names need to be changed to unit 
specific at some point. The change of names can take place when the minimal cut sets are 
pre-processed for the combination in site PSA. The database needs to contain information on 
the correspondence between the names used in the single-unit PSA and site PSA. 
The quantification of the minimal cut sets could also utilise the site PSA database. Alternatively, 
relevant initiating event and basic event data from the site PSA database could be imported to 
the software tool used. In this latter case, an interface between the database system and the 
software tool would need to be developed. 
7. Guidelines for site PSA model management 
Table 2 presents the main documentation and model management tasks in different analysis 
phases and in the maintenance phase. In this section, the whole analysis process is gone 
through from the documentation and model management point of view. 
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Table 2: Documentation and management tasks in different analysis phases. 
Analysis phase Documentation Model and database management 
Selection of 
analysis scope 
and risk metrics 
Documentation of the 
scope and risk metrics 
 
Preparations 
before analysis 
Documentation of 
references and PSA 
model versions 
 
Analysis of POS 
impact 
Documentation of the 
POS analysis process 
and results 
Insertion of POSs, POS groups and POS 
group combinations to the database 
Identification of 
multi-unit 
initiators 
Documentation of the 
initiator screening 
process and results 
Insertion of multi-unit initiators to the database 
Identification 
and selection of 
dependencies 
Documentation of the 
dependency screening 
process and results 
Insertion of dependencies to the database, 
screening of dependencies with the single-unit 
models, insertion of multi-unit basic events to 
the database 
Analysis of 
source terms 
(level 2 only) 
Documentation of the 
source term analysis 
process and results 
Insertion of source terms, source term 
combinations and release categories to the 
database 
Data analysis Documentation of the 
data analysis process 
and results 
Systematic analysis of those multi-unit 
initiators and basic events that were screened 
in using the database, insertion of frequencies 
of initiating events and probability parameters 
related to multi-unit basic events to the 
database 
Quantification of 
multi-unit risks 
Documentation of the 
results 
Computation based on the single-unit models 
and database 
Maintenance of 
site PSA 
Update of relevant 
parts of the 
documentation when 
needed, 
documentation of 
changes 
Process for updating site PSA, model 
configuration management, version control, 
verification and validation of model changes 
Besides the above listed analysis phases, for level 2 purposes, it might be necessary to 
dedicate a step for the assessment of multi-unit plant damage states. 
7.1 Selection of analysis scope and risk metrics 
The analysis starts with the selection of scope and risk metrics. Recommended risk metrics 
have been documented in [4]. In the selection of the scope at least the following issues should 
be considered: 
 Radionuclide sources that are considered 
 PSA levels and end states included in the analysis 
 Release categories need to be selected if the analysis covers level 2. 
The release categories can be the same as in single-unit PSAs, but the 
analysis can also be simplified by creating larger release categories and 
not considering release timings in the release categorisation. It is 
possible to consider only one release category of large or unacceptable 
release, which is considerably simpler than the analysis of multiple 
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smaller release categories. Release categorisation may also be decided 
later after the analysis of source term combinations. 
 Types of initiators considered 
 Operating states considered 
 The scope of SSCs considered including the fixed date for the plant (site) 
configuration being analysed. 
These selections are documented in the chapter Selection of analysis scope and risk metrics 
in the site PSA document. 
7.2 Preparations before the analysis 
PSA model versions that are used in the analysis are selected and documented. It is possible 
to make some adjustments to the model versions before the analysis, e.g. concerning release 
categorisation or modelling of multi-unit aspects as discussed in Section 4.2. 
The main source documents are listed in the site PSA document. 
7.3 Analysis of POS impact 
Analysis of POS impact is performed in the following steps: 
1. Review POSs to obtain basic information on their differences. Pay particularly attention 
to the status of the primary circuit and available core cooling and residual heat removal 
systems. 
Steps 2-5 concern an individual unit. If the units are similar with regard to POSs, the 
procedure can be performed only for one unit, but otherwise it needs to be performed 
for each unit separately. 
2. Make a table of POSs e.g. with the following headers: POS identifier, description, time 
share, status of primary circuit, status of the core cooling system, status of the residual 
heat removal system and status of the spent fuel pool. The relevant systems to be 
included here are plant specific and more headers should be included if there are more 
systems. 
3. Merge together those POSs that are sufficiently similar to form POS groups. The 
grouping can be based on the configuration of residual heat removal systems as 
discussed in Section 4.2 of [1]. 
4. Make a table of the individual POS groups with the following headers: 
a. POS group identifier 
b. Specific POSs belonging to the group 
c. Justification for the grouping 
d. Estimated time share 
e. Time window for core/fuel damage in case of loss of residual heat removal 
f. Screening decision and justification 
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Add the POS group table to the site PSA document. 
5. Estimate the time shares of POS group combinations. Consider only the POS groups 
that have been screened in. 
6. Make a table of POS group combinations with the following headers: 
a. POS group combination identifier 
b. For each unit, the POS group included in the combination 
c. Estimated time share 
d. Screening decision and justification 
Add the POS group combinations table to the site PSA document. 
7.4 Identification of multi-unit initiators 
1. Go through the initiating events in the single-unit PSA models and categorize them in 
the following groups: 
 single-unit initiating event 
 multi-unit initiating event 
 partial multi-unit initiating event 
2. Analyse the possibility that a single-unit accident introduces an initiating event in 
another unit (or that a multi-unit accident of two units introduces an initiating event in 
third unit, etc.). Make a list of potential cases. 
3. Make a table of multi-unit initiators (including partial multi-unit initiating events and 
propagating accidents) e.g. with the following headers: 
a. Identifier 
b. Category (multi-unit initiating event, partial multi-unit initiating event or single-
unit event that propagates to another unit) 
c. Description 
d. Frequency (may not be available at this point for all events) 
e. Screening decision and justification 
f. Source documents 
g. The corresponding initiating events in the PSA models 
h. Relevant POSs 
i. POS dependency 
j. Season dependency 
k. POS group combinations to be included in the analysis and justification 
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4. Divide each partial multi-unit initiating event into multi-unit initiating events 
corresponding to different unit combinations and into single-unit initiating events. Add 
the information on this process to the database and site PSA document. Add the new 
multi-unit initiating events to the previous table. The category for these events is a 
‘multi-unit initiating event that originates from a partial multi-unit initiating event.’ The 
other data, except the frequency, can be inherited from the original partial multi-unit 
initiating events. 
Add the multi-unit initiator table to the site PSA document. 
5. Make a table of the multi-unit analysis cases. For each analysis case, at least the 
following information needs to be included (possible to complement with information 
related to the initiator or POS group combination): 
a. Identifier 
b. Multi-unit initiator 
c. POS group combination 
List the multi-unit analysis cases in the site PSA document. 
7.5 Identification and selection of dependencies 
7.5.1 Qualitative analysis 
1. Identify all multi-unit dependencies. Some guidance can be found in Sections 5.2 and 
6 of [1]. The identification of human action dependencies is specifically discussed in 
Sections 8.2-3 of [1]. 
2. Make a table of multi-unit dependencies with e.g. the following headers: 
a. Identifier (name) 
b. Dependency category (shared SSC, identical components, spatial dependency, 
human dependency, simultaneous maintenance or phenomenological 
uncertainty) 
c. Description (e.g. systems and components involved) 
3. Analyse each dependency qualitatively and define the qualitative ranking according to 
the categories defined in Table 5.1 of [1]. 
4. Add the following information of each dependency to the dependency table (if 
applicable): 
a. Qualitative ranking and its justification (reasoning behind it) 
b. Source documents 
c. The units to which the dependency is related, if there are more than two units 
d. Basic events related to the dependency in the single-unit PSA models 
Add the multi-unit dependency table to the site PSA document. 
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7.5.2 Quantitative screening 
1. Screen each previously screened in multi-unit dependency quantitatively based on 
single-unit basic events as presented in Section 5.2.2 of [1]. For each dependency, 
add the following information to the database and site PSA documentation: 
a. Fussell-Vesely in each multi-unit initiating event in each unit 
b. The increase factor (defined in [1]) in each multi-unit initiating event in each 
unit 
c. Maximum contribution from potential multi-unit sequences in each unit 
d. Screening decision 
Note that if the analysis covers level 2, at least the level 2 dependencies need to be 
screened on the basis of release category frequencies. It is possible to perform the 
screening for multiple release categories separately. 
2. For each screened in dependency, identify the relevant multi-unit initiating events. The 
previously calculated Fussell-Vesely values can be utilised. Make a table of the multi-
unit analysis cases specifying the relevant multi-unit dependencies for each analysis 
case. 
3. Based on each screened in multi-unit dependency, define one or more multi-unit basic 
events. Make a table of the multi-unit basic events e.g. with the following fields: 
a. Identifier 
b. Description 
c. Related multi-unit dependency 
d. Source documents 
e. Related units (if there are more than two units) 
f. Related basic events in the single-unit models 
4. Make a table of the multi-unit analysis cases specifying the relevant multi-unit basic 
events for each analysis case based on the relevant dependencies. 
7.6 Analysis of source terms (level 2 only) 
1. Review source terms of individual units.  Determine which source terms are relevant 
for the screened in MUIEs. Make a table of source term categories, with the following 
headers: Source term category identifier, description, screening decision (based on 
relevance for selected MUIEs and possibly based on single-unit level 2 PSA results) 
and justification. The description header can be split into several headers describing 
specific characteristics of the source term category. 
2. Analyse combined source terms from individual units and how they are associated in 
different release categories. Assess the relevance of source term combinations for 
multi-unit analysis. Screen out insignificant combinations. Make a table for source term 
combinations with headers: Group identifier, associated release category, screening 
decision, and justification for screening and how the combined source terms are 
associated in the release category. 
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3. Review selected release categories based on analysis results. Make a table of release 
categories with headers: identifier, description, source term combinations. 
4. Add the source term combinations table to the site PSA document. If release categories 
have been changed, update the Selection of analysis scope and risk metrics chapter 
in the site PSA document accordingly. 
7.7 Data analysis 
7.7.1 Initiating events 
1. Go through each partial multi-unit initiating event. If at least one multi-unit initiating 
event that has been created based on the partial multi-unit initiating event has been 
screened in, estimate the corresponding frequency/frequencies as discussed in 
Section 7.2.2 of [1]. 
Write the following information of each partial multi-unit event in the site PSA document 
if applicable: 
 Data sources 
 How the frequencies have previously been estimated for individual units 
 The frequencies used in single-unit PSAs 
 Summary of operating data 
 Qualitative analysis including 
 different causes for the event and how they affect units 
 How the new frequencies are estimated for multi-unit analysis 
 The frequencies of the new multi-unit initiating events. 
A database table with the above information for each partial multi-unit event can also 
be made. 
2. Make a table of all multi-unit initiators that have been screened in. The headers of the 
table can be e.g.: 
a. Identifier 
b. Affected unit combination (if there are more than two units) 
c. Data sources 
d. How the frequency is estimated 
e. Frequency (total annual frequency) 
Add the table to the site PSA document. 
3. Estimate the frequency of each multi-unit initiating event in each POS group 
combination that is relevant for the initiating event (if not already available). If an 
initiating event has no POS dependence, the annual event frequency can be multiplied 
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by the POS group combination time share. If an initiating event depends on POSs, it is 
expected that POS specific frequencies can be found in the single-unit analyses. 
4. Make a table of multi-unit initiating events and POS group combinations. Each cell of 
the table specifies the frequency of the corresponding initiating event in the 
corresponding POS group combination. Add the table to the site PSA document. 
7.7.2 Multi-unit basic events 
1. Estimate the probability of each inter-unit CCF that has been screened in according to 
formulas presented in Section 7.3 of [1]. 
2. Make a table for inter-unit CCFs including the following information for each CCF if 
applicable: 
a. Identifier 
b. Component type 
c. Failure mode 
d. Units (if more than two units are analysed) 
e. Group size 
f. CCF combination (or combinations if multiple combinations are merged) 
g. Data sources 
h. Single-unit CCF probability in each unit 
i. Summary of operating data 
j. Model used in the estimation 
k. Parameters used in the estimation 
l. Probability of the inter-unit CCF 
Add the table to the site PSA document. 
3. Estimate the probability of each multi-unit human error event. Section 8.4 of [1] provides 
instructions for two different estimation methods. 
4. Make a table of multi-unit human error events e.g. with the following headers: 
a. Identifier 
b. Description 
c. Related basic events in the single-unit models 
d. Probabilities of the basic events in the single-unit models 
e. Qualitative assessment from the multi-unit point of view 
f. Multi-unit probability estimation method 
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g. Multi-unit penalty factor or dependency category [1] in each multi-unit analysis 
case 
h. Probability in each multi-unit analysis case 
Add the table to the site PSA document. 
5. If other types of multi-unit basic events have been screened in, their probabilities also 
need to be estimated and documented (possibly separately for each multi-unit analysis 
case). Section 7 of [1] provides some guidance on the data analysis of different types 
of multi-unit dependencies. 
7.8 Quantification of multi-unit risks 
Two methods for the quantification of multi-unit risks are presented in [1]. One is based on 
computation of conditional core damage probabilities of multi-unit event combinations, and the 
other one is based on combination of the minimal cut sets of the units. They are discussed 
separately in the following subsections. 
7.8.1 Multi-unit event combinations approach 
For each multi-unit analysis case (multi-unit initiator and POS group combination) that has 
been screened in: 
1. Create an event tree with relevant multi-unit basic events. 
2. Calculate the frequencies of the multi-unit scenarios based on the event tree. 
3. For each multi-unit scenario that has a frequency larger than the selected screening 
threshold (e.g. 1E-8/year for level 1 and 1E-9/year for level 2), calculate the CCDP in 
each relevant unit. If there is no advanced computation support available, the 
calculations can be performed in the following way: 
a. Set the initiating event frequency to 1 and the probabilities of the basic events 
related to the multi-unit basic events to 1 (or statuses to “failed”). If needed, 
select also the correct POS. For example, if there is a basic event 
representing the time share of the POS, its probability needs to be set to 1. 
b. Make sure that other initiating events do not skew the result. It should be 
possible to focus on the initiating event specific results. Even if multiple 
initiating events appear in the same event tree, the result can be calculated 
by multiplying the total frequency with the Fussell-Vesely of the initiating 
event. Alternatively, the frequencies of other initiating events can be set to 0. 
c. Successes of multi-unit basic events can also be taken into account 
(optional). It should be noticed that even though a multi-unit basic event does 
not occur, a related single-unit basic event may occur. A portion of the 
probability of the single-unit basic event comes from the multi-unit event. This 
portion can be subtracted from the probability of the basic event to make the 
computation more accurate. 
d. Calculate the event tree in the single-unit model, or reminimize and 
recalculate the corresponding minimal cut set list to get the conditional core 
damage probability. 
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If the analysis covers level 2, the CSTP is calculated for each considered source term 
category in each relevant unit. 
The following concerns all multi-unit analysis cases together. 
4. Make a table of the multi-unit scenarios (can be initiating event specific or cover all 
initiating events). For each multi-unit scenario, it can include the following information: 
a. identifier of the multi-unit initiator 
b. Identifiers/names of the multi-unit basic events 
c. The POS group combination 
d. The frequency of the scenario 
e. The related basic events in the single-unit PSA models 
f. The CCDP in each unit 
g. The MUCDF of the scenario (for each combination of units if there are more 
than two units) 
If the analysis covers level 2, the CSTP value of each source term category in each 
unit, and the MUSTF of each source term category combination (for each combination 
of units if there are more than two units) are included. 
Add the table(s) to the site PSA document. 
5. For each unit combination (if there are more than two units), calculate the MUCDF by 
summing the MUCDF values (related to the analysed unit combination) of all multi-unit 
scenarios. Report the calculated MUCDF values in the site PSA document. 
If the analysis covers level 2, calculate the MUSTF of each relevant source term 
category combination for each unit combination. 
6. Calculate the SCDF. 
If the analysis covers level 2, calculate the site level frequencies of release categories. 
7. Calculate and document relevant risk importance measure values. 
8. Make conclusions on the results and write them to the site PSA document. 
7.8.2 Minimal cut set list approach 
1. Pre-process minimal cut sets of individual units if needed. If different units have single-
unit events with the same names, the names of the single-unit events need to be made 
unit specific. 
2. Combine minimal cut sets of different units to make the minimal cut set list(s) needed 
for the quantification. One option is to make a minimal cut set list for “site level core/fuel 
damage”, i.e. a list containing the minimal cut sets of all units. Another option is to 
create a minimal cut set list for “multi-unit core/fuel damage” by multiplying the minimal 
cut sets of different units (according to Boolean algebra). If there are more than two 
units, minimal cut sets lists can be created for different unit combinations. Both options 
can be used to calculate the site core/fuel damage frequency. The needed minimal cut 
set lists depend on the selected risk metrics. 
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If the analysis covers level 2, one option is to make a minimal cut set list for each 
analysed release category at the site level. Alternatively, minimal cut set lists can be 
generated for different source term combinations, and the risk metrics can be 
calculated based on the frequencies of the combinations. 
3. Prepare the database and rules for the quantification of the minimal cut sets (if not 
ready already based on the previous analysis phases). 
4. Calculate the selected risk metrics from the minimal cut set lists. 
5. Calculate relevant risk importance measure values from the minimal cut set lists and 
document them. 
6. Make conclusions on the results and write them to the site PSA document. 
8. Maintenance of site PSA 
It is recommended that the names and locations of documents and files used in the analysis 
are listed in the site PSA document chapter Documents and files used in the analysis. All files 
and documents should also have version numbers. 
To maintain the site PSA, a log of changes needs to be maintained. All changes in site PSA 
input data need to be documented in the log. The model changes need to be documented so 
that they can be traced back to the inputs. Single-unit models need to always be updated 
before site PSA. When the site PSA is updated, it is recommended that the whole analysis 
procedure and site PSA document are gone through with the list of changes, and the relevant 
parts of the database, site PSA document and calculations are updated step by step. Summary 
of those updates should also be added to the log. New versions of modified documents and 
files should be created. 
If special versions of single-unit models are needed for site PSA, it is likely better to create the 
special versions based on the current single-unit models every time when the site PSA is 
updated, instead of maintaining alternative versions of the single-unit models along with the 
main versions. 
9. Conclusions 
In this report, guidance for site PSA model management is given and requirements for a site 
PSA database are specified. This report follows the developed site PSA approach [1] and it 
considers the same analysis phases.  
Site PSA’s requirements for single-unit PSA models are discussed, and documentation and 
database needs for site PSA are presented. Analysis phase by phase guidelines for site PSA 
documentation and model management tasks are given. Also site PSA maintenance is 
discussed. The guidelines can also guide the performance of the actual analysis and serve as 
a checklist. The focus of the report is on level 1 issues, but also level 2 aspects are covered. 
The guidelines presented in this report are meant to support the developed site PSA approach 
[1] and they are not applicable as such to alternative approaches. These guidelines need to 
be kept up-to-date with possible method updates and modifications. 
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